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SYMPOSIUM: THE FUNDING OF
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN LIGHT
OF LOCKE V. DAVEY
LOCKE V. DA VEY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION
Paul Finkelman* and Carol A. Hudson**
A year ago legal scholars and political leaders watched closely as the United
States Supreme Court considered and then decided Locke v. Davey.'
Commentaries and law review articles were full of predictions of what the court
would decide, and what ramifications the decision would have, especially on the
future of state funded vouchers to sectarian schools. 2 Even beyond the legal world
3journalists took an unusual interest in the case.
On February 25, 2004, the Court announced its decision. To the shock of
most, the dismay of many, and the relief of others, the Court, in a 7-2 decision,
held that Washington State did not violate the United States Constitution when it
denied Joshua Davey a state-sponsored scholarship because he wanted to use the
money for religious training.4 Davey had met every qualification necessary to
receive Washington's Promise Scholarship.5  However, the scholarship was
explicitly limited to those who were not studying devotional theology.
* Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law.
** J.D. Candidate, University of Tulsa College of Law (expected May 2006).
1. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
2. See Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional Questions, 72 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 151 (2003); Kyle Duncan, Secularism's Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious
Persecution, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 493, 570 (2003); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future:
Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev.
917 (2003); Brandi Richardson, Student Author, Eradicating Blaine's Legacy of Hate: Removing the
Barriers to State Funding of Religious Education, 52 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1041, 1078 (2003); Joseph P.
Viteritti, Davey's Plea: Blaine, Blair, Witters, and the Protection of Religious Freedom, 27 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Policy 299 (2003).
3. Editorial, The Blaine Game, 242 Wall St. J. A18 (Dec. 2, 2003). The extreme views on the issue
were illustrated by The Wall Street Journal's description of the law at stake in Davey as "operat[ing]
mostly to deny inner-city black and Latino kids a shot at a decent school." Id.
4. Davey, 540 U.S. at 717.
5. Id. at 716-17.
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Washington authorities had denied Davey a scholarship because the state
constitution explicitly prohibited state funding for religious training.6 The state
officials quite logically concluded that Davey's intention to major in theology
made him ineligible for the scholarship.7
In Davey's initial suit, the federal district court granted summary judgment
to the state, and Davey appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. A
divided Ninth Circuit ruled that Washington had discriminated against Davey
because of his religion.8 The Court of Appeals based its decision on recent U.S.
Supreme Court cases supporting an expansive notion of free exercise and equal
protection.9 When it granted certiorari, most commentators believed that in light
of its recent pronouncements, 10 the U.S. Supreme Court would uphold the Ninth
Circuit's decision, and in effect strike down a portion of the Washington
Constitution. In its decision, the Supreme Court did not elaborate at length on its
holding. It simply found that although Washington would not violate the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution if it did award Davey the scholarship, it
did not violate his free exercise rights by denying him the scholarship. 1 It
characterized this area between the two halves of the Religion Clause as "play in
the joints."' 2
The brevity of the Court's decision in Davey belies the magnitude of the
issues involved. It was at once a case concerning the Establishment Clause, the
Free Exercise Clause, religious discrimination, equal protection, incorporation of
the First Amendment to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, state
funding of education, and federalism. The whole issue, however, boiled down to
whether Washington, under its own constitutional guidelines and interpretations,
could refuse to fund private religious education, while at the same time funding
private secular education. Davey argued that this was unconstitutional
discrimination against his religion and that he was denied his free exercise and
6. Id. at 717.
7. Id.
8. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 760 (9th Cir. 2002).
9. The court seemed to particularly rely on Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002);
Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
10. Particularly relevant were Zelman, 536 U.S. 639, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,
509 U.S. 1 (1993), and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), dealing with funding, and Rosenberger,
515 U.S. 819, Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508
U.S. 384 (1993), and Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990), dealing with discrimination
based on religion.
11. Davey, 540 U.S. at 718.
12. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). The full context of the quote is
interesting in light of the issues at hand:
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by the
Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or
governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental
acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.
Waltz, 397 U.S. at 669.
[Vol. 40:219
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equal protection rights. The State of Washington's claim was far more simple.
The State argued that its constitution prohibited it from funding religion and that
this prohibition was fully consistent with the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, which, when applied to the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment, bars both the national government and the state from supporting
any religion. Indeed, Washington argued that the essence of the separation of
church and state would be violated if the state used tax money to support religious
institutions.13 In Davey, the Supreme Court upheld this strict understanding of
separation of church and state.
It was not surprising that there would be much interest in the case's
outcome. The debate surrounding the limits of judicial federalism have been
evoking ever-increasing demands for answers to the question of where lines are to
be drawn. Federalism issues are at the heart and soul of at least two hot button
political and social issues of our times: vouchers and same-sex marriage. Both
involve issues that have been traditionally in the hands of the state: educational
funding, religion, and marriage. For the first one hundred and fifty years of
America's history there was not much reason to question a state's right to defer to
and interpret its own constitution-particularly in regard to the protection of
individual rights and the separation of church and state. At the time of the
Founding, most states had some form of religious establishment. In addition, all
but New York and Virginia initially had religious tests for officeholding. 14 Most of
these disappeared by the 1820s, although a few lingered into the Jacksonian
period. 5 Most state support for religious institutions also disappeared in the first
two decades under the national constitution, although New Hampshire's
constitution provided for state support for religion into the twentieth-century.
6
Many supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment believed it would make the
Bill of Rights applicable to the states, 7 but in what many scholars regard as a
wrong turn in constitutional jurisprudence, the Court, in the Slaughter-House
Cases,8 eviscerated the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and left the states free to regulate civil liberties, including
religious freedom, without any constraints from the national government. In the
early 1920s, the Court began to apply the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect fundamental rights, 9 and in 1925 the Court, with little
13. This position dates from the earliest American ideas of separation of church and state, and was
clearly articulated by James Madison, who later became the "father" of the Bill of Rights, in his
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. See Relig. Freedom Page, Presentation to
the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/
madisonm&r_1785.html (accessed February 12, 2005).
14. J. Jackson Barlow, Officeholding Clause of Constitution and Religious Test for Officeholding,
and Officeholding: Religious-Based Limitations in Eighteenth-Century State Constitutions, in Religion
and American Law: An Encyclopedia 345-46, 346-48 (Paul Finkelman ed., Garland 2000).
15. Id.; see Morton Borden, Jews, Turks, and Infidels (UNC Press 1984).
16. Compare N.H. Const. pt. I, arts. 4-6 (1784) with N.H. Const. pt. I, arts. 4-6 (amended 1968).
17. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, in No State Shall Abridge:
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 57-91 (Duke U. Press 1986).
18. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
19. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
2004]
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fanfare, decided that the Fourteenth Amendment in fact incorporated the Speech
and Press Clauses of the First Amendment to the state.2 ° This led to the gradual
incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights to the states. By the end of the 1940s,
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses were recognized as applying to the
states." In 1940, the Court incorporated the Free Exercise Clause to the states in
Cantwell v. Connecticut.22 In 1947, the Court applied the Establishment Clause to
the states in Everson v. Board of Education.23 In a case that allowed states to fund
transportation to students of private and parochial schools, Justice Black, writing
for the Court, decreed that the Establishment Clause was now applicable to the
24
states. It is here that Justice Black injected Thomas Jefferson's metaphor,
written in an 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists, into the national consciousness. 25
He wrote that "[i]n the words of Thomas Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion was intended to erect a 'wall of separation between
church and state.' 2 6 The Court's task now became determining exactly how this
feat was to be done. Since the First Amendment had been understood up to this
time to reserve religious decisions to the states, how was the Court to ensure the
states their sovereignty under judicial federalism, and yet uphold the requirements
of the First Amendment? It has proven to be a daunting task.
In the half century since Everson, the Court has struggled to produce a
meaningful answer to the dilemma between incorporation and federalism. The
Court's attempts have brought it criticism from all sides. For the first three
decades following Everson, the Court diligently attempted to implement Justice
Black's charge to erect a high and impenetrable wall of separation between church
and state. The most conspicuous area that was affected was the arena of public
education. Often ruling against popular opinion, the Court virtually eviscerated
any sign of the once predominant Protestant influence from public schools,
replacing it with a determined secularism. Removing prayer, Bible reading, and
any funding of sectarian education, its chief tool in attempting to apply this
doctrine was developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman where it devised its infamous
three-part test. According to Lemon, a law must: (1) have a legislative purpose
that is secular; (2) neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) not excessively
entangle the government with religion. 28 However, even the Court itself found
Lemon to be insufficient as a guideline as it has time and time again revised and
reinterpreted it.
20. See Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
21. See infra nn. 22-23.
22. 310 U.S. 296.
23. 330 U.S. 1.
24. Id. at 2, 18.
25. Id. at 16. For a comprehensive history of Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists and the
effect its inclusion in Everson has had on First Amendment jurisprudence and the national
consciousness, see generally Philip Hamburger, The Separation of Church and State (Harv. U. Press
2002).
26. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
27. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
2& Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 40:219
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Over the past two decades the Court has moved away from its goal of strict
separation and allowed a gate to be installed in the wall. That gate is neutrality."
The Court now finds that rather than requiring total separation from religion, the
Establishment Clause requires neutrality toward religion: neither favoring nor
disfavoring it.3° This has been particularly true in the area of funding. In Everson,
Justice Black clearly enunciated a funding principle, and it was a simple one: there
was to be no funding by the government of religious enterprises." "No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion., 32 This decree was to apply not only to the federal
government, but to the states as well, which before the decree were free to fund
(or not fund) whatever religious endeavors they chose. Regardless of the strong
rhetoric in Everson, the Court has never consistently held to this strict standard.
Equipped with the new emphasis on neutrality, the tide arguably began to
irrevocably turn with the Court's view of funding in Mueller v. Allen.33 The Court
held that there was a difference in state aid to religious schools when the aid was
indirect and based on parental choice. 34 Mueller was followed by a string of cases,
all standing for the proposition that where choice breaks the link between the
government and the religious institution, there is no violation of the Establishment
Clause.35
The Court's emphasis on neutrality also affected its decisions regarding
nondiscrimination. It had most recently articulated this nondiscrimination
doctrine in its 1993 decision of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,36 where it stated that "the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a
law not discriminate on its face. A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a
religious practice without a secular meaning discernible from the language or
context."37 The Ninth Circuit relied on Lukumi in determining that Washington
38had indeed discriminated against Joshua Davey's free exercise of religion.
Is Davey headed for the annals of history as a landmark case? If the Court
had found that Washington discriminated against Davey's free exercise of religion,
29. "A central lesson of our decisions is that a significant factor in upholding governmental
programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion." Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 839. For a discussion of the evolution and application of the neutrality principle, see
Gabriel A. Moens, The Menace of Neutrality in Religion, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 535.
30. Davey, 299 F.3d at 752. "We recur to basic principles. The First Amendment declares:
'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.' Thus, the state may neither favor, nor disfavor, religion. A law targeting religious beliefs as
such is never permissible." Id.
31. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16, 18.
32. Id. at 16.
33. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
34. Id. at 403-04.
35. See Zelman, 536 U.S. 639; Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997); Zobrest, 509 U.S. 1; Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
36. 508 U.S. 520.
37. Id. at 533.
38. Davey, 299 F.3d at 752-53, 757.
2004]
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then it might have found that the relevant section of the Washington
Constitution39 was unconstitutional. This means Davey would have marked the
death knell for those state constitutional amendments that contain establishment
clauses that are stricter than the federal Constitution, and left states with no
refuge against funding for religious schools. Those so-called "Blaine
Amendments" are named for Speaker of the House, James G. Blaine, who from
1869 to 1875 attempted to push through Congress an amendment to the
Constitution that would prohibit religious schools from ever receiving any direct
or indirect tax money.40 The impetus for the proposed amendment was alleged to
be Catholic bigotry on the part of Protestants who had a firm toehold in the public
schools, and did not want tax money to follow Catholics who left public schools to
start their own schools. Although Blaine's attempt at a federal amendment failed,
to date approximately two-thirds of state constitutions have amendments to their
constitutions with similar wording.41 These amendments were rarely used by the
states over the years, as they were rarely needed. Before Everson, state
sovereignty in religious matters was rarely questioned. Even after Everson, U.S.
Supreme Court decisions on the Establishment Clause were strict enough to
render state establishment clauses redundant. However, as the Court began
taking a new approach to First Amendment funding issues, some states balked at
the new approach to funding and dusted off their own constitutional establishment
clauses. They began basing their holdings on their own establishment clauses
instead of the now more lenient grounds of the Constitution's Establishment
Clause precedent. The question came to a climax in Davey. Would the Supreme
Court allow the states to do so? How would the Supremacy Clause and
incorporation affect the states' rights to do so?
Historical analysis also played a significant role in Davey and the drama
leading up to it. Everson had arrived at its conclusions about the importance of
building a wall of separation between church and state by presenting a virtual
dissertation on the history behind the First Amendment, particularly the views of
39. The clause at issue in the Washington State Constitution reads:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship
shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person
or property on account of religion .... No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any
religious establishment ....
Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
40. For a detailed history and analysis of Blaine's amendment and its progeny see Hamburger,
supra n. 25, at ch. 11. The Blaine amendment reads:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public
schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted thereto shall
ever be under the control of any religious sect or denomination; nor shall any money so
raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.
Richard Aynes, Blaine Amendment, in Religion and American Law: An Encyclopedia 40 (Paul
Finkelman ed., Garland 2000).
41. Supra n. 39.
[Vol. 40:219
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Jefferson and Madison. In the 1985 case of Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice Rehnquist
set forth his own version of constitutional history in opposition to Justice Black's.
43
The contrast between the two versions confirms suspicions that history is in the
eye of the beholder. In Davey, Chief Justice Rehnquist once again reverted to a
history lesson, warning that from the beginning of our nation's history "there have
been popular uprisings against procuring taxpayer funds to support church
leaders." 44
So what can we learn about the current status of First Amendment
jurisprudence from Davey? Perhaps we are no closer than before to having an
understanding of the nexus of incorporation and federalism. What promises are
guaranteed to citizens regarding their free exercise of religion under the First
Amendment, and where do those promises intersect with the state's right to
construe their own constitutional establishment clause provisions? In Davey, the
Court saw federalism as the prevailing precept, at least in this instance.
What does this mean for the issues at stake, particularly for state funding of
vouchers for education? What effect will the decision in Davey have? In the final
analysis, not many questions were definitively answered. Davey's detractors are
already looking for ways the decision might be distinguished. They would also
remind us that the Court did not give its approval to so-called Blaine amendments;
it simply said that Blaine amendments were "not before us." '45 There is still hope
in that camp that Blaine amendments might yet be ruled unconstitutional. A
quick online shepardizing of Locke v. Davey will already produce many law
review articles responding to the decision. We believe the articles in this
symposium issue will also shed more light on the issues at hand.
42. 472 U.S. 38.
43. Id. at 91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
44. Davey, 540 U.S. at 722.
45. Id. at 723 n. 7.
20041
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